This paper examines underwriter reputation loss by using a sample of investment banks that have served corporate clients prior to the discovery of clients' alleged financial reporting fraud. The results indicate that underwriters lose reputation upon the filing of lawsuits against their clients.
Introduction
Financial reporting fraud has received tremendous press and public attention in recent years. High profile accounting fraud cases, such as WorldCom Inc., wiped out a stock that had been worth about $185 billion at its peak in 1999. 1 In one of the largest class-action settlements ever, Citigroup Inc. agreed to pay $2.65 billion to settle a suit brought by WorldCom investors.
The lawsuit alleges that Citigroup and other investment banks didn't conduct adequate due 2 Although, the negative stock price reactions to the disclosures of wrongdoings are well documented for reporting firms (see, for example, Kellogg (1984) ; Karpoff and Lott (1993) ; Gerety and Lehn (1997) ), the impact of clients' financial scandals on their underwriters' reputations remains to be examined.
If an underwriter mis-certifies a client and raises capital for a non-meritorious project, investors may suffer losses, as evidently demonstrated by the stock market crash since the beginning of 2000, and the failure of many high profile giant firms. 3 Capital markets may discipline the underwriters that misrepresent their clients either due to incompetence or because of intentionally fraudulent collusion. In this study, we examine the discipline mechanism of stock price reaction. The reputation loss of an underwriter should be translated into its lower stock price, which indicates the potential revenue loss in the future and the possible legal liability in present value. 4 We test these negative underwriters' stock prices reactions to clients' alleged financial reporting fraud as the market discipline hypothesis.
The market's ability to discipline financial intermediaries becomes increasingly important to regulators due to the integration of financial services in the decade of 1990s, which poses tremendous new challenges to policy makers. In addition, related to the third pillar of Basel II, market price information is considered a potentially important regulatory tool that complements the first two pillars. 5 There is extensive literature examining market discipline on commercial banking activities. 6 To our best knowledge, though, ours is the first paper examining such an issue for underwriters. The enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999, which permits combining commercial banking, investment banking, and insurance within a financial holding company, makes this paper especially timely. Because we also analyze if there is a difference between the market reactions to entrant commercial banks' and to incumbent investment banks' mis-certification, it fills a significant void in the bank regulation literature.
We study a sample of industrial firms that are sued in securities class actions for alleged financial reporting fraud during 1996 to 2002. We identified the underwriters that served these clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the class period ending date.
We also analyze separately the initial public offering underwriters. In most of the lawsuits, the class period ending date represents the time of wrongdoing discovery or the announcement of radically unfavorable financial information. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the time periods surrounding this event date. The second important event date is the lawsuit filing date. 4 In an effort to partition the effects of reputation loss and lawsuit liability, we hand collected the detailed lawsuit information and identified if an underwriter was sued along with its client. 5 The new Basel Capital Accord (also known as Basel II) that provides capital and risk management guidelines to virtually all commercial banks with extensive global operations consists of three pillars: (1) minimum capital requirements, (2) supervisory review of capital adequacy, and (3) public disclosure and market discipline. See the web site of Bank for International Settlements (http://www.bis.org/index.htm) for more information on Basel II. 6 For an excellent review on this subject, see Flannery (1998) .
The unfortunate news of firms' failure may not indicate any wrongdoings. However, a lawsuit filing greatly increases the probability that firms have engaged in unlawful misconducts. In this case, the failure of underwriters' screening is more evident.
Our results indicate that underwriters lose reputation capital when their clients are sued for financial reporting fraud. 7 However, the significant negative stock reactions cluster in the later part of our sample period and only upon lawsuit filing. There is little evidence of market reaction on the class period ending date, which indicates that the market does not penalize underwriters just because the clients fail. It reacts to the stronger signal of a lawsuit filing where the probability of wrongdoings is higher. Besides, prior to the stock market crash in 2000, there is little evidence that the market reacts to the events considered in this paper. These findings indicate that the extent of market discipline depends on the overall market sentiment. The interaction between market discipline and overall market condition may complicate further the usage of market price information as a regulatory tool.
Upon the lawsuit filing, the mean three-day cumulative market-adjusted abnormal return (CAR) for underwriters is -0.36%. This is equivalent to $16 million of underwriters' market value loss for an average underwriter size. This number corresponds to an average of $1.4
billion of client's recent market value loss using a 3-day event window surrounding the class period ending date. All the numbers are significantly different from 0. In particular, during years 2001 and 2002 the negative three-day CARs for underwriters are highly significant with the numbers of -1.14% and -0.6%, respectively. The findings are consistent with the market discipline hypothesis. 7 The control for potential lawsuit liabilities of underwriters is not significant in the multivariate analysis, although it is significantly negative in the univariate test.
The extent of discipline is heterogeneous. Further analysis regarding the nature of market discipline shows that the magnitude of reputation loss is smaller for investment banks diversifying their underwriting businesses across industries. The stock market reacts more negatively if investors suffer more recent dollar damages due to issuing firms' wrongdoings, if clients can hide their misconducts longer, and if an issuing firm has a larger portfolio weight as an IPO client. As the number of clients being sued increases, an underwriter loses credibilty in certification, and the market penalizes the underwriter more severely. The above findings are mainly driven by the stock price reactions for incumbent investment banks. We find little evidence that the market disciplines entrant commercial banks in a systematic way because they have broader banking businesses than most of the incumbent investment banks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the determinants of market discipline and underwriter reputation loss. It also reviews the client-intermediary relationship literature. Section 3 describes the sample selection and event study method. Section 4 presents the results of market discipline and underwriter reputation loss. Section 5 concludes.
Market Discipline, Underwriter Reputation, and Client-intermediary Relationship

Market reaction and corporate fraud
Studies on corporate wrongdoing show that corporate fraud has a significant negative impact on shareholder wealth. Kellogg (1984) announcements and find significantly negative mean abnormal returns of -9.2 percent. In summary, these studies support a negative significant stock market reaction to the announcement of restatements and alleged financial reporting fraud.
Market discipline of financial intermediaries
Similar to corporate wrongdoings, the failure of banks may be subject to market discipline. For example, Docking, Hirschey, and Jones (1997) document significantly negative stock reactions upon the announcement of increases in loan-loss reserves. Musumeci and Sinkey (1990) study the effect of international debt crisis. Besides equity returns, disciplinary actions by depositors (Goldberg and Hudgins, 2002; Billett, Garfinkel, and O'Neal, 1998) , and by subordinated debt investors (Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; DeYoung, Flannery, Lang, and Sorescu, 2003; Evanoff and Wall, 2001 ) have been investigated to assess the appropriateness of using market information as a regulatory device. 8 However, the value and risk of banking firms may be difficult to access due to the opacity of their assets (Morgan, 2002) . Even if there are significant security price reactions, there is little evidence that such market monitoring prompt managerial actions (Bliss and Flannery, 2002) . More general issues involving the impacts of bank failures during Great Depression are discussed in Calomiris and Mason (2003a, 2003b) .
The focus of our paper is on investment banking rather than traditional commercial banking activities. The gradual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act during the decade of 1990s, however, makes the topic on the impact of this expanded banking power indispensable among the banking literature. Kanatas and Qi (2003) analyze theoretically the economics of combined lending and underwriting. They conclude that market power may provide commercial banks less incentives to innovate and incur underwriting efforts than investment banks. 9 The complex nature of financial holding companies due to the integration of commercial and investment banking makes the task of control and monitoring by regulators much more challenging.
Investors' reactions to events in underwriting at the holding company level demonstrate the effect of stand-alone activities on the conglomerate firms. They can shed some light on the impact of banks' newly expanded investment banking activities on the banks as a whole. It is unclear, however, how the market may react to commercial banks' mis-certification relative to that of investment banks. The less underwriting efforts of commercial banks contended by Kanatas and Qi (2003) indicates a less severe market penalty on commercial banks than on investment banks due to less disappointment. Besides, the scope economy of combined lending and underwriting means that commercial banks are more diversified than investment banks.
They can, thus, absorb more negative impact from their clients, which also indicates less market reactions. However, the benefits of universal banking -information advantages and flexible financing -predict more market discipline because the belief of greater certification abilities causes greater disappointments and negative surprises. Therefore, we also examine if the market reactions differ between investment banks and commercial banks.
Client-intermediary relationship
regressions are not likely to adequately address the relationship between the value of debt and underlying risk. 9 See also Song (2003a), which empirically examines the differences between investment banks and commercial banks as underwriters at the co-manager level. The participation of commercial banks as co-managers in an investment bank lead syndicate can enhance underwriting services due to the information advantages and the flexible financing opportunity (choice between bank loans and public debt) of commercial banks. On the other hand, the reputation of a lead investment bank can mitigate the conflicts of interest of a commercial bank when a client also borrows from the commercial bank co-manager.
Relationship is a keyword in the financial industry. It indicates ongoing interactions between parties for information exchange and the willingness to participate. For example, Diamond (1991) theoretically proposes a reputation-building model for borrowing firms and shows that bank monitoring provides a certification function for firms to raise public capital.
Empirical findings show that the renewal of loans by lenders provides a positive signal about the borrowers. This sends a message to the capital markets that the borrowing firms are good and sound (see James, 1987) . Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Patel (1999) show similar results. They find that the existence of bank debt lowers the net yields of bonds issued by the firm's making debt IPOs (first debt issues). Billett, Flannery, and Garfinkel (1995) find that lenders with higher credit ratings are related to larger abnormal borrower returns upon loan announcements.
Similar to lending, underwriters provide certification when they help clients raise funds in the capital markets. The theoretical work by Titman and Trueman (1986) and Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) shows that underwriters with better information technology tend to develop a better reputation and underwrite for higher quality firms, which increases the securities prices clients receive. The role of underwriters as certifiers of issuing firms has been documented in several empirical studies (Beatty and Ritter, 1986; Carter, Dark, and Singh, 1998) .
The aforementioned studies focus on what intermediaries may do for their clients. Few touch the issues regarding how clients affect their intermediaries, in particular, underwriters. 10 In addition, the nature of market discipline driven by false certification deserves further investigation to enhance the knowledge regarding the overall management of financial system.
Determinants of market reactions and variable definitions
We test a market discipline hypothesis that the market reacts negatively to the information of clients' alleged financial reporting fraud and penalize underwriters for miscertification. However, sorting out the failed firms due to misconducts from the unfortunate clients because risky projects do not work out is a very challenging task. Investors may believe that these questionable clients as honest failures and not react to such events.
We view underwriting activities like a portfolio. A diversified portfolio reduces the effect of idiosyncratic risk associated with an individual client. We construct a Herfindahl index to measure diversification of underwriting activities across industry segments based on two-digit SIC codes. The index for bond market is the sum of square of underwriting portfolio weights in industries. The portfolio weight in bond underwriting is yearly bond issue amounts underwritten in an industry by an underwriter divided by total bond amounts engaged by the same underwriter during the same period. We compose the index for bond and equity markets separately because the market structures of bond and equity underwriting are quite different. Most bond underwriters are also equity underwriters, but not the reverse. So we use a combined Herfindahl index, if the underwriter conducts business in equity underwriting, then industry diversification is the index in equity market, otherwise, it is the index in bond market. 11 We also control for the size of underwriters by using the market values of underwriters.
Another set of variables measure the relative importance of clients to underwriters, and vice versa. The larger the weight of a client in an underwriter's portfolio, the more important the client is to the underwriter. In the event of mis-certifying the client, the consequence can be more severe because the loss of a big client and thus larger future revenue. Conversely, if an underwriter has a larger weight in the client's underwriter relationships, then it should have a 11 We construct an alternative Herfindahl index using bond market first then equity market. We also use the number of issues rather than the dollar amounts to construct the Herfindahl index. However, the results are robust to greater responsibility for the failure of screening and may suffer more reputation loss. The number of underwriter relationships is used to examine the ability of market to pin point the responsible underwriter. A high number of underwriter relationships can reduce the impact on individual underwriters in a group and makes the market discipline less effective. 12 We analyze IPO clients separately because they have more information asymmetry problem. Therefore, there is a greater reliance on underwriter's reputation. In the case of mis-certification, the penalty on underwriters should be larger.
The magnitude of damages in recent market crash is unbearable for many investors. The greater the damages, the more severe the market should penalize the underwriter. We measure the firm market value loss during the class period plus one day following the class period ending date as a proxy for investor damages. Clients' three-day CARs (-1, 0, 1) surrounding class period ending day and the market value of clients 60 trading days prior to the end of class period are also examined for the same reason. Besides, we use the interaction of clients' three-day CARs and firm value as a proxy for recent firm value loss.
In addition to the analysis of the difference between commercial and investment banks, which may have different reputations in underwriting, we examine if the market reacts more to underwriters with better reputations (use market share as a proxy following the work by Megginson and Weiss (1991) ). More reputable underwriters may cause greater disappointments in the event of mis-certification. We also investigate the time lag between the beginning and the end of class period. The longer the time a client can hide information indicates less effective screening from the underwriter because the underwriter should have stopped working with the different specifications, so we drop the alternative measures. 12 See Song (2003b) for the empirical analysis on how group reputations affect the incentives of individual underwriters in a group to serve clients that do not merit certification during the Internet bubble period.
firm before the unfavorable information becomes public knowledge. Furthermore, if the underwriter continues to tap capital from the markets, it could prolong the scandal.
Because some firms were sued multiple times, we control for the number of lawsuits for each client. As to underwriters, the first few incidences of client lawsuits may not cause any concerns. However, when more and more clients were discovered of wrongdoings, the market may react stronger to the cumulative events. Therefore, we numbered the observations for each underwriter chronologically to control for the sequence of client lawsuits. Detailed variable definitions are listed in Table 1 .
Sample Description and Event Study Methods
Sample
Corporate clients sued in federal securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 (post-PSLRA) are identified from the web site of the Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse (http://securities.stanford.edu).
13 Therefore, the sample is within the same regime of securities litigation requirement. We focus on the suits that are related to financial reporting fraud because part of underwriters' job is to verify the true financial condition of client firms and to screen these securities issuers for investors.
This study uses the class period ending date cited in the client's securities fraud lawsuits as the event day to identify the underwriters having served in client's nonconvertible bond or equity issuances within the prior 5-year period. Class period ending date is the time when the information regarding a client's irregular behavior is uncovered. We also identify issuers' IPO underwriters. The information on underwriters and securities offers is taken from the New we focus on publicly traded underwriters and the time period is also different. If an event date is following the merger effective date, we use the merged underwriter's stock returns in our analysis. Otherwise, we use the original underwriter's returns. We also use the announcement date of mergers to examine if these activities contaminate our event study results. Controlling for these merger events does not affect our results. Therefore, we drop these analyses. Table 2 reports the frequency distribution of all sued firms with stock price information and of firms with underwriter information. Although the number of firms shrinks from 679 to 559, the distributions across years are quite similar. More than 50% of the sample occurs during the last three years (2000) (2001) (2002) . Panel B, Table 2 shows that most of the firms were sued only once in our final sample, 42 were sued twice and 3 were sued three times.
Event study method
We use the event study technique to measure the market reactions to alleged financial reporting fraud. Both market-adjusted and market model abnormal returns (AR) are calculated with the CRSP equally weighted index as a proxy for the market return. Because the findings are similar for both types of abnormal returns, we report the market-adjusted ARs. The OLS regression estimation period for market model is 60 trading days that ends 26 trading days before the event date. If the market is closed on the event day, the following day is used in the analysis.
Both two-day (-1, 0) and three-day (-1, 0, 1) event windows are examined. It appears that the market continues to react on day 1. Therefore, we focus on the three-day analysis.
Panel A, Table 3 , reports, by year, the stock price reactions of sued firms surrounding the allegation of financial reporting fraud (the class period ending date). The significantly negative cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which are the sum of ARs during the 3-day event window, confirm the findings of prior studies. We do not observe increasing trend in Panel A. The average 3-day CARs is -27.7% in Panel B. 
Descriptive Statistics
Summary statistics for sued firms and event time intervals are reported in Table 5 . The mean (median) market value of sued firms is $7.5 (0.74) billion on the class period starting day.
We also measure firm values at 60 trading days prior to the end of class period. The numbers are similar. Firms with public debt access appear to be much larger, the value is $33.5 (11.5) billion in mean (median).
Mean frequency of bond issuance within the 5-year period prior to the allegation of financial reporting fraud is 6.7. The median is 3. The average total issue amount during the same period is $ 1.9 billion with an average number of underwriter relationships of 3.2.
Although there are more firms issuing equity within the 5-year period, the mean frequency is 1.7
with mean total amount of $251.1 million. The average IPO issue amount is $110.4 million. For all issuers, the mean (median) number of prior underwriter relationships is 1.5 (1). Among the 481 firms that IPO underwriters can be identified, there are 51 firms do not have any underwriter relationships within the 5-year period prior to the class period ending date and 20 of them conduct their IPOs prior to 1991. Excluding these 51 IPOs does not change the main conclusions of this paper but the findings are less significant for the full sample. However, the subsample analysis for investment banks remains robust. Information on underwriters is reported in Table 6 We also construct the portfolio weights using different time intervals (within the 5-year, 4-year, and so forth) and found only the measure during the immediate year prior to the class action ending date have some marginal explanatory power in determining market reactions but it is still very weak and mostly insignificant. Because the analysis is insensitive to the timing of security issuance prior to lawsuits filing, so we drop other weights with time intervals longer than one year in the analysis. Table 6 also compares the differences between commercial and investment banks.
Commercial banks are much larger than investment banks in firm size, but have smaller issue market shares in both bond and equity underwriting since they are entrants. Commerical banks are also less diversified than investment banks in underwriting activities. However, these banks are the largest banks, they all have huge traditional banking operation. Median commercial bank clients also have larger weights in the underwriting portfolios than median investment bank clients, but there is no differece in the measure for underwriter importance to client. Table 7 reports the results of market reactions for underwriters using market-adjusted abnormal returns surrounding the date of lawsuit filing. We also investigate the market reactions on the class period ending date (results not reported). However, in general, there is little evidence of underwriters' stock reaction upon the discovery of clients' potential misconducts.
Underwriter Reputation Loss
Instead, investors penalize underwriters when lawsuits are formally filed. Therefore, we focus only on the lawsuit filing date. We analyze both two-and three-day CARs and find that threeday CARs are more significant. 14 Appendix B reports the results of two-day CARs. It appears that the market continue to react negatively one day following the lawsuit filing with the exception in 2000. In 2000, market reverses the reaction from significantly negative to insignificant. Therefore, we focus on the findings of three-day CARs. We also use both marketadjusted and market model analyses. The findings using market model analysis are less significant but similar to those using market-adjusted analysis. Thus, we report only one set of findings, i.e., market-adjusted CARs. The results of market model CARs are reported in Appendix C.
14 We also examine the market reactions for longer event windows. However, there is little evidence that the market reacts to lawsuit filing during the month prior to the event date.
Panel A, The median is more significantly negative with a value of -0.43%. Panel B demonstrates that the market reacts more negatively when the clients are sued again than the first time lawsuits.
However, the differences between CARs of first lawsuits and those of second lawsuits are insignificant. Motor Company allege that its officers issued a series of false and misleading statements during the class period concerning the quality and safety of its products and assert that these misleading statements and material omissions artificially inflated the price of the company's stock during the class period. There is only one lawsuit filing against WorldCom is related to inflate bond price, which is also alleged of using improper accounting practice. In the case of AT&T Wireless Group tracking stock issuance, AT&T and its underwriters are sued jointly for failing to disclose ongoing business problems at AT&T Wireless in the Prospectus. The average market reactions for misstatement in IPO or SEO and for underwriters also sued in the class actions are both significantly negative. However, those for insider trading, inadequate internal control, and merger related lawsuits are insignificant. Model (1), Panel A, shows that underwriters diversifying across industries can reduce the negative impact of clients' alleged financial reporting fraud. 15 The largest possible number for the industry concentration (Herfindahl index) is one, which means an underwriter only serves one industry. The smaller the number (approaching to 0), the more diversified is an underwriter.
Therefore, the significant estimate of -3.1 indicates that less diversification is associated with more negative CARs.
Despite the effect of diversification, the extent of market discipline is positively related to if the issuing firms are large IPO clients, days of class period intervals, and clients' recent firm value losses. IPO clients have greater informational asymmetry problems. In this case, underwriter reputation is more important in the certification process. Besides, an IPO underwriter is the first underwriter that brings a firm to the public market, thus, it may play a more prominent role in its client's intermediary relationship. In the event of false certification, the penalty should be more severe. In addition, a positive relation should be observed between market discipline and the duration that clients can hide information because the longer the time clients can cover up wrongdoings, the less effective is the underwriter's ongoing screening as client-intermediary relationships tend to be long term in nature. In addition, the estimates on numbered sequence of underwriter observations show that, as more and more clients are sued, the market questions more about the reputation of underwriters and penalizes underwriters more severely for the later lawsuits. The results are consistent with the market discipline hypothesis.
However, the estimates on multiple underwriter relationships and if the underwriter is sued with the client are both insignificant. The latter is the variable that we use to partition the effect of lawsuit liability from that of underwriter reputation loss.
In Model (2), we examine if market reactions are stronger following 2000. The dummy variable indicating years 2001 and 2002 is significant. This confirms the univariate results mentioned earlier that market discipline depends on the overall market sentiment because the magnitude of clients' losses and the numbered sequence of observation for each underwriter are also controlled for in the regression. Therefore, the more severe discipline is not only triggered by larger clients' losses and the sequence of the events but also the time period.
Panel B, Table 10 compares the differences between commercial and investment banks.
It is obvious that the results of investment banks drive those in Panel A. In various robust checks, such as excluding IPO observations prior to 1990 or clients with the largest recent value losses in the top 5 percentiles, the findings for investment banks are qualitatively unchanged.
Panel B also shows that the market does not systematically discipline commercial bank underwriters. The only estimate that is the same for both types of underwriters is on recent client value losses. These findings demonstrate that the efficacy of using market reactions to discipline commercial banks' underwriting activities is very limited. The low values of adjusted R-square in all models also indicate that one should be cautious when using market reactions as a regulatory tool.
Conclusions
In this study, we investigate the impact of clients with alleged financial reporting fraud on their underwriters' reputation to enhance more understanding of the mechanism and management of financial system. In addition, the efficacy of market discipline as a regulatory tool gains more importance in recent years as financial intermediaries become increasingly complex. The enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999 allows the integration of various financial services within a financial holding company makes study of this sort very timely.
In general, we find that the market disciplines underwriters. However, the extent of reputation losses depends on many factors. The magnitude of market discipline is greater for clients causing larger recent dollar losses of investors, hiding misdemeanors longer, and for the IPO clients with larger weights in the underwriters' portfolios. As more and more clients being sued, an indication of a serious problem in mis-certification, the market penalizes underwriters more severely. On the other hand, an underwriter can avoid severe market discipline by diversifying its underwriting activities across industries and reducing the impact of an individual client. However, most of these findings are attributable only to investment banks rather than to commercial banks.
The stock prices reactions of underwriters upon the discovery of clients' potentially fraudulent misconducts have important implications for policy makers, investors, and underwriters themselves. If the penalty is too small, then underwriters may not have enough incentive to keep their reputation capital at the socially optimal level. Policies that supplement market discipline should be in place to reinforce the lawful and ethical conduct of underwriters.
If both market discipline and regulation cannot provide sufficient incentives, then investors should value the securities with more appropriate probability of wrongdoings and not blindly trust the system.
The results of investment bank analysis suggest that the discipline mechanism is indeed in place. Therefore, market information can be used for regulatory purpose. However, the findings of commercial bank analysis indicate that it should be applied cautiously. The disciplinary effect is limited because most of the largest financial intermediaries, such as commercial bank underwriters, are well diversified across different markets. The effectiveness of diversification greatly reduces the sensitivity of market discipline on a stand-alone activity. In addition, stock price reactions to underwriters' reputation losses also depend on the overall sentiment of the market, which may complicate the regulatory use of stock price information further.
Table 1 List of variables
Variable Definition
Industry diversification -bond market or equity Sum of square of (yearly amounts underwritten in an industry by an underwriter in bond underwriting/total amounts engaged by the underwriter in bond underwriting during the same period), i.e., the Herfindahl index. That for equity market is defined in the same manner. The value of 1 means no diversification across industry segments classified by the 2-digit SIC codes.
Industry diversification (both bond and equity markets)
Equals to "industry diversification -equity market" if underwriter engages in equity market; "industry diversification -bond market" otherwise.
Underwriting portfolio weightclient (-1 yr)
Amounts issued by a client within the 1-year period prior to the end of class period/yearly total amounts engaged by its underwriter*100
Underwriting portfolio weight -IPO client
Amounts of client's IPO issue/yearly total amounts engaged by its underwriter*100
Underwriter importance to client (-1 yr)
Amounts underwritten by an underwriter within the 1-year period prior to the end of class period /total amounts issued by its client during the same period*100
Days of class period interval Number of days between the start and the end of class period
Firm value losses during class period ($billons)
Buy and hold returns during class period of sued firm multiplied by the market value of sued firm on the class period starting day Recent firm value losses (surrounding class period ending date ($billons))
Three-day (-1, 0, 1) market adjusted CAR of sued firm around class period ending day multiplied by the market value of sued firm 60 trading days prior to class period ending day Sued firms' two-day marketadjusted CARs (%)
The sum of the two-day (-1, 0) CAR surrounding class period ending day Ln(sued firm's market value) Log(1+market value of sued firm 60 trading days prior to class period ending day in $MM)
Ln(underwriter's market value) Log(1+market value of underwriter 60 trading days prior to lawsuit filing day in $MM)
The numbered sequence of underwriter observations based on client's lawsuit filing date
The number equals 1 if the observation is the first incidence that an underwriter appears in the sample based on client's lawsuit filing date, equals 2 if it is the second incidence, and so forth.
Underwriter reputation -bond (equity) market
Yearly issue share of underwriter in bond (equity) underwriting market during the calendar year prior to the class period ending year. 3.14 * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 5 Summary statistics for sued firms' prior securities issuances and event time intervals
The sample contains non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud and with underwriter stock information. See Table 6 Summary statistics for underwriter reputation, diversification, and underwriter-client ties
The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The differences between commercial and investment banks in mean and median are tested by t-test and Wilcoxon test, respectively. The test significance is indicated under "Investment banks." See Table 1 for variable definitions. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All underwriters
Table 7 Stock price reactions to underwriters' reputation losses surrounding the filing of lawsuits
The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The three-day event window is (-1, 0, 1). Day 0 is the event day. Marketadjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of the daily returns surrounding the event day in excess of CRSP equalweighted index. Panel A (B) reports the frequency by year (by client's number of lawsuits). Mean and median are tested by t-test and Wilcoxon sign-rank test, respectively. *** * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
All underwriters
Table 8 Market reactions to underwriters' reputation losses by underwriter
The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The three-day event window is (-1, 0, 1). Day 0 is the lawsuit-filing day. Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of the daily returns surrounding the event day in excess of CRSP equal-weighted index. Yes 3 -1.7 -2.3 -3.6 0.9 * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 9 Market reactions to underwriters' reputation losses by type of allegation
The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The three-day event window is (-1, 0, 1). Day 0 is the lawsuit-filing day. Market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of the daily returns surrounding the event day in excess of CRSP equal-weighted index. * , ** , and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 10 Determinants of underwriters' reputation loss surrounding lawsuits filing day
The dependent variable is three-day market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) of underwriters. These underwriters have served the sued issuers in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period or in initial public offerings prior to the end of class period. These issuers are non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. The three-day event window is (-1, 0, 1). Day 0 is the lawsuits filing day. Market-adjusted CARs are the sum of the daily returns surrounding the event day in excess of CRSP equal-weighted index. Appendix B Two-day stock price reactions to underwriters' reputation losses surrounding the filing of lawsuits
The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The two-day event window is (-1, 0 The sample contains underwriters of non-financial firms that were subject to securities fraud class actions during 1996-2002 due to alleged financial reporting fraud. These underwriters have served the clients in bond or equity offerings within the 5-year period prior to the end of class period or in initial public offerings. The three-day event window is (-1, 0, 1). Day 0 is the event day. Market model cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are the sum of the daily abnormal returns surrounding the event day estimated from a market model. 
